Management Perceptions Of Share

Repurchases In Emerging Markets: The Case

For Malaysia by Lee , Siew Peng & Isa, Mansor
AAMJAF, Vol. 11, No. 1, 97–121, 2015 
 
© Asian Academy of Management and Penerbit Universiti Sains Malaysia, 2015 
              ASIAN ACADEMY of  
MANAGEMENT JOURNAL 
 of ACCOUNTING 
 and FINANCE 
  
 
MANAGEMENT PERCEPTIONS OF SHARE 
REPURCHASES IN EMERGING MARKETS: THE CASE 
FOR MALAYSIA 
 
Lee Siew-Peng1* and Mansor Isa2 
 
1Faculty of Accountancy and Management, Universiti Tunku Abdul Rahman,                  
Bandar Sungai Long 43000 Selangor, Malaysia 
2Faculty of Business and Accountancy, Universiti Malaya, 50603                               
Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia 
 
*Corresponding author: leesp@utar.edu.my 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
The purpose of this paper is to study the perceptions of Malaysian chief finance officers 
(CFO) concerning their reasons for repurchasing shares.  We sent a survey questionnaire 
to the chief finance officers of all the companies listed on the Malaysian Stock Exchange 
that made repurchase announcements over the period 1 September 1997 until 31 
December 2011. The results indicate that the main reason for Malaysian companies to 
engage in share repurchases is to protect their share prices from market 
undervaluation. This reason supports the signalling hypothesis, which is found in most of 
the empirical studies on market reaction to share repurchase announcements. Other 
repurchase motives, such as to increase EPS, to adjust capital structure, and to use as a 
substitute for cash dividend received less support from our respondents. These findings 
are useful, especially to investors for understanding the intention of companies to 
repurchase shares.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Share repurchase is a rather recent phenomenon in the Malaysian corporate 
scene, which came into effect in the aftermath of the 1997–1998 financial crisis. 
The timing of the regulations was most likely motivated by the expectation that 
companies would quickly take the opportunity to repurchase their undervalued 
shares. In this context, repurchase is perceived by the regulators as an instrument 
to support declining share prices. In theory, there are several possible motives for 
repurchase: to signal underpricing of shares, to signal future performance of 
companies, to substitute cash dividends for capital gains, to increase leverage in 
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the capital structure, to help protect a company from potential takeovers, and to 
accumulate treasury shares. Although empirical studies generally find a positive 
market reaction to repurchase announcements, the true reason is relatively 
unknown as positive market reactions may be consistent with several motives. It 
is also possible for companies to have multiple objectives for engaging in share 
repurchases.  
 
Several researchers have conducted management surveys to determine 
firms' reasons for making repurchases. However, the findings of these surveys 
indicate significant inconsistencies in the managers' responses. For example, 
surveys in the US tend to find responses related to under-pricing of shares as the 
main motivation for share repurchases (Wansley, Lane, & Sarkar, 1989; 
Tsetsekos, Kaufman, & Gitman, 1991; Baker, Powell, & Veit, 2003; Brav, 
Graham, Harvey, & Michaely, 2005). In Australia, the main reason for 
repurchases seems to be to increase earnings per share (EPS) (Mitchell, 
Dharmawan, & Clarke, 2001), while, in the UK, managers cited the need for an 
optimal capital structure as their main reason for repurchases (Dixon, Palmer, 
Stradling, & Woodhead, 2008). Although there may be common motives in the 
list of motivations resulting from these surveys, the fact remains that the leading 
reason is the divergence across markets. More surveys are needed to discover 
whether management repurchase decisions are based on common grounds across 
markets, or whether there are unique reasons for each market. 
 
The objectives of the present study are to obtain direct information from 
the companies concerning their actual reasons for making repurchases and to 
understand various aspects of repurchasing practices. A two-page survey 
instrument that contains questions concerning the motives and practices for 
repurchases is used in the survey. The study contributes to the literature in several 
ways. Previous studies on managers' views concerning repurchases have been 
performed in developed markets, such as the US, UK and Australia; the present 
study is the first such study in Malaysia, hence providing evidence from a 
developing market. In addition, Malaysia's repurchase regulations are rather strict 
with respect to announcement requirements, timing, price, and amount 
restrictions compared to other countries. Therefore, this study could be compared 
with others in terms of differences in regulations, market size, and market 
maturity.  
 
 
REPURCHASE REGULATIONS 
 
Share repurchase has been permitted in the Malaysian market since 1 September 
1997.1 Companies are only allowed to make repurchases in the open market, and 
shareholders' approval is required before repurchases can occur. The regulations 
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require the shareholders' approval and for companies to make an immediate 
announcement to the stock exchange upon the board’s decision to engage in share 
repurchases. Shareholder approval may be obtained in an annual general meeting 
or in an extraordinary general meeting. The approval is valid for a year or until 
the next shareholders' annual general meeting. The actual purchase of shares may 
be spread over a period of time and may even continue for over a year. If the 
repurchase is not completed in the approval year, a new approval must be 
obtained. Companies are allowed to repurchase a maximum of 10% of the 
number of outstanding shares.  
 
The regulations further stipulate that repurchases can only be funded by 
retained earnings and/or the share premium account; they may also be funded 
from other sources, but they must be sufficiently backed by retained earnings and 
the share premium account. The firms making repurchases are also required to 
disclose details of the exchange transaction, such as the repurchase price and 
volume at no later than 6.30 p.m. on the day the repurchase was made. Regarding 
the repurchase price, the rules require that it must not be greater than 15% above 
the 5-day average price for that security calculated over the last five market days 
immediately prior to the repurchase date. Local regulations allow repurchased 
shares to be cancelled or retained as treasury shares or to be partly cancelled and 
partly retained. The treasury shares may be used for stock dividend distribution, 
employee share option schemes, or re-sold to the market. In any case, once shares 
are repurchased, the number of outstanding shares and the equity component in 
the capital structure will be reduced. Repurchased shares are not entitled to 
voting rights or dividend payouts.  
 
The local regulations differ significantly from those in the US, but are 
more similar to the UK, Hong Kong, and European markets. A detailed 
discussion on repurchase regulations across ten of the world's largest markets is 
provided by Kim, Schremper and Varaiya (2005). In the US, Canada, and Japan, 
share repurchases do not require shareholder approval as is required in Malaysia 
and many other markets. Furthermore, there are no restrictions with regards to the 
timing, volume, or repurchase price levels in the US, and companies are not 
required to report their repurchase activities to the market. In Malaysia, as 
discussed above, there are various restrictions concerning a repurchase 
transaction, the most important of which includes price and volume restrictions as 
well as reporting requirements. 
 
 
REPURCHASE HYPOTHESES 
 
Several hypotheses are discussed in the finance literature on the possible reasons 
for companies wanting to repurchase their shares. Grullon and Ikenberry (2000) 
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and Dixon et al. (2008) present an excellent discussion on various repurchase 
hypotheses. In this section, we evaluate the merits of these hypotheses when 
applied to the local market. 
 
Presumably, the most prevalent hypothesis is the signalling of the 
underpricing of shares. This phenomenon occurs when a repurchase decision is 
made because the firm's management believes that its shares are undervalued by 
the market. Being an insider, the management is assumed to possess superior 
knowledge about the firm compared to the general public. When a company 
announces a repurchase decision, this announcement is taken by the market as 
signalling an underpricing of shares, and a positive market reaction is expected. 
The market reaction, therefore, prevents further share undervaluation. In addition, 
buying shares at an undervalued price may also be considered a good investment 
for the firm. However, a more traditional application is the signalling of a better 
financial future for the firm. Due to information asymmetry, the good prospect of 
the firm may not have been completely incorporated in the current market price. 
In other words, the management expects share prices to adjust upwards once the 
market becomes aware of the hidden information. Whatever the signalling case 
may be, the repurchase decision is driven by the discrepancy between 
management valuation and market valuation. Together with the signalling reason, 
there are other closely related motives for repurchases, such as "to stabilise or to 
support share prices". The management feels that the share prices have dropped 
too low in relation to the fair value, which prompted them to take action in an 
effort to prevent prices from further declining. 
 
Another often discussed motive for share repurchase is to cause a change 
in the capital structure, which comes in the form of reducing outstanding shares 
and the equity component, thereby increasing leverage. If the repurchase is 
financed by debt, gearing ratios will adjust more rapidly as the level of debt is 
increased, while at the same time, the level of equity decreases. Increasing 
leverage in general may reduce the cost of capital. Capital structure studies in the 
US have documented that the market reacts positively to changes in capital 
structure, which leads to an increase in leverage. However, in Malaysia, Isa 
(2008) finds that most companies are averse to debt and have rather low debt 
ratios. This phenomenon may imply that companies are not keen to increase their 
respective leverage. Furthermore, a study by Kester and Isa (1994) finds that 
managers prefer new equity to debt when external financing is needed—a finding 
that is contradictory to the pecking order hypothesis found in most developed 
markets. Hence, the local market may not attach a valuation effect to a leverage 
increase decision of a firm similar to that found in developed markets. 
 
Grullon and Ikenberry (2000) mention that in press statements 
announcing a repurchase, managers often state that the reason for repurchases is 
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to increase EPS. It is indeed true that repurchases would reduce the market 
capitalisation of a company, and in turn, increase a company's EPS as earnings, 
which are distributed across a smaller volume of shares. As long as analysts and 
investors are placing importance on the role of EPS in share valuation companies, 
they may continue to use share repurchases to enhance their respective EPS. 
However, it should be noted that the increase in EPS is due to the accounting 
treatment of repurchases and should not be regarded as a source of value. The 
source of value necessarily comes from a more fundamental reason that takes 
place in a repurchase activity, such as a better allocation of assets where low-
yielding excess cash is used to invest in the companies' respective undervalued 
shares. 
 
Share repurchases may act as a substitute to cash dividends, thereby 
enabling companies to distribute cash to shareholders in the form of capital gains 
as opposed to cash dividends (Grullon & Ikenberry, 2000; Grullon & Michaely, 
2002; Skinner, 2008). In markets where capital gains taxes are lower than 
dividend taxes, share repurchases may become a better alternative for cash 
distribution among shareholders. Although the dividend substitution hypothesis 
suggests a positive impact of share repurchases on market prices, this effect may 
not be that obvious when applied to the Malaysian setting. In Malaysia, capital 
gains are non-taxable. Before 2008, Malaysia practiced a full imputation tax 
system on cash dividends, but since 2008, a single tier tax system has been 
implemented. Briefly, in a single tier tax system, dividends are non-taxable. 
Hence, cash dividends and capital gains would similarly affect shareholder's 
wealth. 
 
Other hypotheses, such as the anti-takeover strategy and the 
accumulation of treasury shares, may not be important motives in the local 
context. This conjecture stems from the fact that restrictions on the amount of 
shares and repurchase prices may not be significant enough to deter takeover 
threats. Regarding treasury shares, their accumulation is not a necessary 
condition for the purpose of stock dividends and ESOS, as new shares may be 
created from the capital accounts. 
 
Given the discussion above, it seems logical to expect that the main 
reason for local firms to repurchase shares is related to their undervaluation of 
shares. Other hypotheses, such as dividend substitution and altering capital 
structure, may not be supported based on economic arguments and firms' 
practices. Increasing EPS may seem to be a popular motive among market 
participants, but this phenomenon is just an accounting outcome of the 
repurchase activities. 
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LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Market-based Research 
 
Most previous studies on share repurchases find a positive market reaction to 
repurchase announcements. This positive reaction is observed in different 
markets across the globe after the announcement of a repurchase programme, as 
well as after the announcement of an actual market repurchase. Studies on the 
announcement effect of a repurchase programme in the US market include Dann 
(1981), Ikenberry, Lakonishok and Vermaelen (1995), and Chan, Ikenberry and 
Lee (2004). These studies find the announcement of abnormal returns to range 
between 3.0 and 4.0%. Abnormal returns of various magnitudes are also found in 
other markets, such as the following: in Australia by Otchere and Ross (2002); in 
Japan by Zhang (2002), and Hatakeda and Isagawa (2004); in Korea by Lee, Jung 
and Thornton (2005); in Malaysia by Lim and Bacha (2002), and Isa and Lee 
(2014); in China by Huang and Zhou (2007); and in New Zealand by Koerniadi, 
Liu and Tourani-Rad (2007). 
 
Studies on market reaction to actual repurchases include Vermaelen 
(1981), Comment and Jarrell (1991), Grullon and Michaely (2002) for the US 
market; Zhang (2005), and Firth and Yeung (2005) for the Hong Kong market; 
McNally, Smith and Barnes (2006) for the Canadian market; Huang and Zhou 
(2007) for the Chinese market; and Ginglinger and Hamon (2007) for the French 
market. Generally, these studies find the abnormal returns around the repurchase 
days to be between 2.5% and 3.5%, except for the Hong Kong market where the 
abnormal return is much lower – at less than 1.0%. In Malaysia, Isa, Ghani and 
Lee (2011) find an abnormal return of 1.28%.  
 
Although empirical results indicate an increase in share prices on a 
repurchase announcement, it is not immediately clear which factors drive the 
market reaction. A positive market reaction may be consistent with several 
hypotheses, such as the signalling of undervaluation, substitution of a cash 
dividend for capital gains, increasing leverage, distribution of excess cash or lack 
of profitable investments. The majority of the studies seem to support the 
signalling hypothesis; these studies include Vermaelen (1981), Ikenberry et al. 
(1995), Stephens and Weisbach (1998), Kahle (2002), Grullon and Michaely 
(2004), Chan et al. (2004), and Firth, Leung and Rui (2010). 
 
Studies focusing on other hypotheses are lacking. Skinner (2008), Von 
Eije and Megginson (2008), Andriosopoulos and Hoque (2013), and Jiang, Kim, 
Lie and Yang (2013) study the US and European markets, respectively, and 
conclude that there is an observable trend among firms utilising share repurchase 
for replacing dividends as a form of cash distribution to shareholders. Grullon 
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and Ikenberry (2000) note that, in 1998, for the first time, the amount of cash 
spent on repurchases in the US surpassed the amount of cash dividends. Their 
study also finds that the average dividend payout ratio fell from 22.3% in 1974 to 
13.8% in 1998, while the average repurchase payout ratio during the same period 
increased from 3.7% to 13.6%. 
 
Other studies, such as Guffey and Schneider (2004), Grullon and 
Michaely (2004), Espenlaub, Lin, Strong and Wang (2006), and Oswald and 
Young (2008), present evidence that is consistent with the distribution of excess 
cash hypothesis. Specifically, Stephens and Weisbach (1998), and Lee and Suh 
(2011) observe that firms with more excess cash, ceteris paribus, tend to buy 
back larger volumes of shares. Evidence of repurchasing shares to influence 
firms’ gearing is presented by Chan et al. (2004), and Guffey and Schneider 
(2004), while Bens, Nagar, Skinner and Wong (2003), and Hribar, Jenkins and 
Johnson (2006) show evidence in support of firms’ efforts to increase EPS or to 
prevent the dilution of EPS. Regarding takeover deterrence, Dittmar (2000) fails 
to find any evidence that takeover deterrence is a motive for open stock 
repurchases. 
 
Overall, the results of previous studies support the role of share 
repurchases in enhancing firm market value, as reflected by the positive market 
reactions. However, the source of the value increase is relatively uncertain. The 
majority of the previous studies seem to indicate consistency with the 
undervaluation signalling theory.  
 
Survey Research 
 
In the quest to determine the real reasons for companies making repurchases, 
several researchers resort to asking the managers directly about their reasons for 
making such repurchases. In this section, we discuss survey evidence from the 
US, Australia, and the UK pertaining to repurchases. The US surveys are 
provided by Wansley et al. (1989), Tsetsekos et al. (1991), Baker et al. (2003) 
and Brav et al. (2005); the Australian evidence is provided by Mitchell et al. 
(2001); and the UK evidence is provided by Dixon et al. (2008). 
 
Wansley et al. (1989) examine the view of US corporate management on 
the use of open market repurchases and tender offer repurchases. Based on 98 
repurchase respondents, the most important reason for repurchases was 
management's perception that shares were undervalued, followed by "to signal 
management's confidence in the future of the firm". Respondents also agreed to a 
lesser extent with the motives "to increase leverage", "to distribute cash" and "the 
lack of good investments". Managers generally disagree with the motives "share 
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prices were low", "as a takeover defence strategy", and "as a dividend 
substitution strategy". 
 
Tsetsekos et al. (1991) survey major US corporations concerning their 
repurchase motives. Based on 183 respondents, the authors find that the most 
important repurchase reasons are "to change firm's capital structure", "to raise 
share prices" and "to signal information to the market". In a separate question, the 
respondents agreed that the main circumstances that lead to share repurchases are 
"low stock price", followed at a great distance by "the need for treasury shares" 
and "lack of profitable investments". 
 
Baker et al. (2003) survey top financial executives to understand their 
perspective regarding firms’ share repurchases in US companies in the late 
1990s. Based on 194 responses, their results indicate that important reasons for 
repurchases include "to add value to shareholders", "low share prices", hence 
making it a good investment, "to increase EPS", to "support share prices", and "to 
distribute excess cash". Less important motives include "to convey positive 
information", "tax-efficient way to distribute cash" and "to accumulate treasury 
shares". Respondents show less agreement for other motives, such as "to change 
capital structure", "as a substitute for cash dividend" and "as a takeover defence 
strategy". 
 
In a more recent study, Brav et al. (2005) find that the method and 
purpose of dividend and repurchase payments were basically different. 
Specifically, repurchases were believed to be a more flexible form of payment 
that was paid out of temporary income rises or when good investments were hard 
to come by, while dividend payments were considered to be less flexible, and, 
therefore, paid out of permanent income rises. The survey finds that both 
dividends and repurchases are generally used to convey information to investors, 
thereby providing strong support to the signalling hypothesis. Moreover, while 
dividend payments also support free cash flow and clientele hypotheses, 
repurchase programmes were used to invest in their own shares due to very low 
prices as well as to signal undervaluation and allow managers to recognize 
repurchases as a takeover defence strategy. 
 
Mitchell et al. (2001) survey managements' motivations for repurchases 
in Australia. Based on the mean score of 112 respondents, their results reveal that 
the most relevant motivations are to "improve EPS", followed by "the 
undervaluation reason" and "to achieve optimal capital structure". Respondents 
show a lack of support for the motives "to signal management's confidence in the 
future of the firm", "to support share prices" and "to increase leverage". 
Australian managers do not seem to support the "takeover defence strategy" and 
"substitution for cash dividends" as acceptable repurchase motives. Furthermore, 
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Australian managers believe that they are familiar with the potential benefits of 
repurchases, but are uncertain of the shareholders' understanding of repurchase 
implications. 
 
A recent study by Dixon et al. (2008) focuses on repurchase practices in 
the UK. The authors survey the motives for repurchases among finance directors 
of the top 200 UK companies. The results indicate that the primary motive for 
share repurchases in the UK is "to achieve an optimal capital structure". The 
authors regard this result as demonstrating that lowering the cost of capital is a 
major function of UK directors. The next important motive is "to return excess 
cash to shareholders", followed by "to improve EPS", and "to increase gearing". 
Less important reasons include "lack of good investments" and "undervaluation 
of shares" and "to signal management's confidence in the future of the firm". UK 
managers do not seem to support "substitution for cash dividends", "low share 
prices" and as a "takeover defence strategy" as important motives for 
repurchases. 
 
In summary, prior theoretical research has developed an extensive list of 
motivations for share repurchases. However, studies of market behaviour are 
unable to produce a satisfactory single explanation for repurchases, despite the 
fact that the majority of the evidence seems to be consistent with the signalling 
hypothesis. Survey-based studies in the US, UK, and Australia tend to support 
the views that share repurchases are used when companies are undervalued and to 
signal the management’s outlook concerning the future of the company. Other 
important motives include "to increase EPS" and "to achieve an optimal capital 
structure". Secondary motives include "to distribute cash to shareholders", "lack 
of good investments" and "to support share prices". The use of repurchases as a 
"takeover defence strategy" and "as a substitute for cash dividends" does not gain 
support from the surveyed managers. 
 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
Data were obtained from a mailed survey using a two-page questionnaire. The 
questionnaire is divided into three parts. The first part consists of several 
questions that are designed to obtain information regarding the objectives for 
repurchase and methods of implementation. The second part of the survey asks 
respondents to indicate their level of agreement or disagreement with several 
statements on corporate motivations for making share repurchases. The 
statements are related to possible motives for repurchases as found in finance 
texts, as well as from previous repurchase studies. The third part asks respondents 
to identify their position in the company, as well as their contact numbers if 
further clarification is needed. To facilitate comparison with previous surveys, 
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most of the motivation statements are made consistent with those used by 
Wansley et al. (1989), Mitchell et al. (2001), Baker et al. (2003) and Dixon et al. 
(2008).  
 
We searched the Malaysian Stock Exchange website for the names of all 
companies that made the announcement of their board's decision to repurchase 
shares, and we found a total of 509 companies that made the announcement 
between 1 September 1997 and 31 December 2011. However, four of these 
companies had been delisted. The questionnaires, together with a stamped return-
addressed envelope, were mailed to the chief financial officers of all the 505 
remaining companies in October 2012. A second mailing was made several 
months later to those who did not respond to the first mailing. By the end of May 
2013, a total of 122 questionnaires were returned; however, only 118 could be 
used for analysis, giving a total response rate of 23.4%. This response rate is 
comparable to that of Wansley et al. (1989) in the US (22.6%) and Mitchell et al. 
(2001) in Australia (15.7%), but was somewhat lower than that of Dixon et al. 
(2008) in the UK (44.6%). 
 
It should be noted that companies announcing their repurchase intention 
may or may not actually repurchase the shares. Because approval is good for a 
year, companies not making a repurchase in the year of approval, or making a 
partial repurchase of the approved amount, may ask for reauthorisation of the 
approval in the following year. There is no stated limit to the number of 
reauthorisations. Therefore, there is no way of knowing whether a company that 
was not making a repurchase in the first year of approval will ever make a 
repurchase in subsequent years. For our analysis, we divide our total sample into 
those making a repurchase in the first year, which were labelled the ‘purchase’ 
group, and those not making a repurchase in the first year, which were labelled 
the 'no purchase' group. The rationale for this approach is that if the firm is 
serious about wanting to repurchase shares, it does not have to wait for more than 
a year to execute a purchase. Our sub-groups separated the serious from the not-
so-serious repurchase announcements. Of the 118 responses, 81 companies 
(68.6%) subsequently made an actual repurchase, while 37 companies (31.4%) 
did not.  
 
 
RESULTS 
 
Repurchase Practices and Managers' Perceptions 
 
The first part of the questionnaire asks respondents for basic information 
concerning the company's repurchase practices as well as the respondents' 
perceptions concerning certain aspects of these practices. The questions begin by 
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asking the respondents to disclose the main reason(s) for their respective 
company's decision to repurchase shares. This question was designed to allow 
them to think consciously of the actual reasons. The answers are summarised in 
Table 1. As shown in the table, the most commonly disclosed reason (36.44% of 
respondents) is "to prevent share price decline". This result is consistent with the 
undervaluation hypothesis mentioned in most studies. The second most important 
reason is very close to the first: 32.20% of the respondents stated that their share 
prices have fallen too low, which prompted the company to decide to repurchase 
in order "to support share prices". The third most common reason (30.51%) may 
be summarised as "to stabilise share prices". Included in this objective are other 
reasons such as "to reduce price volatility" and "to prevent excessive price 
movements". We rationalise this motive to mean that the company decides to 
obtain approval to repurchase in case there is a need to support the prices when it 
swings too low. Therefore, this objective is also related to the second motive. 
Another somewhat popular reason (22.88%) is "to improve EPS" of the 
company, i.e. to enhance share value. Less frequently mentioned reasons include 
"to distribute excess cash" (6.78%) and "to accumulate treasury stocks" (5.93%). 
There are hardly any surprises in the answers to this question. In fact, the answers 
confirm our expectation that the undervaluation of shares is the overriding reason 
for repurchase decision, which is consistent with the signalling hypothesis in 
market-based studies. 
 
Table 1 
Reasons for share repurchase as provided by respondents in the open-ended question 
 
 
Repurchase motive 
No. of 
respondents 
Relative 
frequency (%) 
1. To prevent share price decline 43 36.44 
2. To support undervalued share prices (market prices fall 
below fundamental value; market prices too low; 
market price below net tangible asset) 
38 32.20 
3. To stabilise share prices (to reduce price volatility; to 
prevent excessive price movements) 
36 30.51 
4. To improve EPS (to enhance shareholders value; to 
reduce number of shares outstanding) 
27 22.88 
5. To distribute excess cash (to optimize use of cash; to 
invest in own shares) 
8 6.78 
6. To accumulate treasury stock 7 5.93 
 
 Table 2(a) summarises the responses for several questions regarding 
companies' repurchase practices. Question 2 of the questionnaire asks whether 
the companies use a timing strategy when making repurchase announcements. 
We find that the majority of the companies (79% of respondents) do not have a 
timing strategy for announcing their decision to engage in share repurchase. A 
few respondents (18%) disclose that they are not free to choose the timing of the 
Lee Siew-Peng and Mansor Isa  
 
108 
announcements; instead, they must comply with the stated rules and regulations. 
The next question (Q3) asks about the approval process. We find that 110 
companies (93%) of the respondents obtained shareholder approval in their 
normal Annual General Meeting (AGM), while only 8 companies (7%) called an 
Extraordinary General Meeting (EGM) for the specific purpose of approving a 
repurchase programme. It is not surprising to find that all those companies going 
for EGM made an actual repurchase in the first year of the approval. Among 
those who obtained approval in an AGM, approximately two thirds (81 
companies) made an actual repurchase in the first year of approval, while one 
third (37 companies) did not.  
 
We further asked the non-purchasers about the reasons for not making a 
repurchase, for which 30 (81.1%) of 37 respondents provided their motives. The 
reasons provided are summarised in Table 2(b). Half of the respondents (results 
not shown in the table) mentioned that they did not make the repurchase in the 
first year because the share price was not low enough. Other responses that carry 
the same meaning include share prices not falling below their benchmark, or 
share prices not being seriously undervalued. The next important reason (11 
respondents, or 37.7%) was an increase in share prices or that their shares 
performed well after the announcement. These two reasons indicate that the 
primary reason for repurchase is undervaluation of the share prices; if prices are 
not undervalued enough, there is no reason to make a repurchase. Other less 
important reasons for not making a repurchase include insufficient public float in 
the market (2 respondents) and to preserve cash (1 respondent) and the company's 
response to market condition. 
 
Question 5(a) enquires about the mode of financing the repurchase. Of 
the 81 companies that made a repurchase, 96% of them used internal funding, 
while only 4% used external funding (see Table 2(a)). In comparison, Baker et al. 
(2003) report that 71% of the companies financed their repurchase with available 
cash: 26% with short-term and long-term debt, and 3% via other means. 
 
Question 5(b) asks whether the repurchase companies used some type of 
timing analysis to repurchase shares in the market. The majority of those making 
a repurchase (62 of the 81 companies or 77%) confirmed that some type of 
timing strategy was used, but only a few companies provided explanations 
regarding these strategies. Among the explanations given were: when share 
prices were too low and prices dropped below a target level, and when shares 
were least traded. The answers to Question 5(c) indicate that 75 companies (93%) 
kept most of the repurchased shares as treasury shares, and only 8 companies 
(10%) indicated that they cancelled the shares. In addition, 3 respondents (4%) 
mentioned that they resold some of the shares.  
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Table 2(a) 
Background information repurchases practices 
 
Questions 
All response (N 
= 118) 
(%) 
Purchase 
(N = 81) 
(%) 
No purchase 
(N = 37) 
(%) 
Do you choose a specific time to make repurchase 
announcement? 
   
• Yes, when share price is low 3.4 4.9 0.0 
• No 78.8 71.6 94.6 
• No, need to comply with regulations 17.8 23.5 5.4 
How did your company obtained shareholders’ 
approval? 
   
• AGM 93.2 90.1 100 
• EGM 6.8 9.9 0.0 
Did your company proceed to make the actual buyback 
(in the first year of approval)? 
   
• Yes 68.6 100  
• No 31.4  100 
For those who made repurchase only (N = 81)    
How was the repurchased financed?    
• Internal funds (available cash) 66.1 96.3 0.0 
• External funds (short-term loan) 2.5 3.7 0.0 
• Other 0.0 0.0 0.0 
In making repurchases, do you use a timing strategy?    
• Yes (only 30 respondent provide reasons, 
ie. Basically when management feels share 
price is too low) 
52.5 
 
76.5 
 
0.0 
• No timing strategy 16.1 23.5 0.0 
What do you do to the repurchased shares?    
• Keep as treasury stock 63.6 92.6 0.0 
• Cancelled 6.8 9.9 0.0 
• Resold to the market 2.5 3.7 0.0 
 
Table 2(b)  
Reasons for not making repurchase after shareholders have given approval 
 
Reason N % Cumulative % 
Share price not low enough 15 0.500 0.500 
Share price increased during the year 11 0.377 0.867 
Insufficient public share spread 2 0.067 0.933 
To preserve cash for expansion and for working capital 1 0.033 0.967 
Response to market condition and company strategy 1 0.033 1.000 
Total 30 1.000 
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Respondents were also asked about their opinion regarding whether 
investors understand the firm's objective for making share repurchases. The 
answer (not shown in the table) reveals that a large majority of the respondents 
(86.4%) feel that local investors do understand the objectives of the firm for 
making repurchases. In the next question, the answers show that approximately 
an equal percentage of the respondents (87.3%) feel that investors understand the 
impact of share repurchases on share prices. In this regard, Mitchell et al. (2001) 
find that only 54.5% of respondents consider the market as understanding share 
repurchases in Australia, and, furthermore, they are uncertain of whether the 
shareholders understand the implications of repurchases. 
 
We also ask respondents their opinion regarding the market reaction to 
each of the three mandatory repurchase announcements: board decision, 
shareholder approval, and actual repurchase. The respondents were also asked to 
indicate whether they feel that the market price would increase, decrease, or 
remain unchanged for each of the announcements. The results are shown in Table 
3. As expected, most of the respondents feel that share prices should increase for 
the first announcement (board's decision) as this is new information to the 
market; the results indicate that 68.6% of the respondents feel that prices should 
increase, while the remaining 31.4% feel that prices should remain unchanged. 
For the announcement of shareholder’s approval, only 30.5% of the respondents 
think that share price should increase, while a large majority (69.5%) think that 
prices should remain unchanged. This result is not surprising given that 
shareholder approval is always granted. Regarding the third announcement 
(actual repurchase), 58.5% of the respondents expect share prices to increase, 
while 41.5% think that prices should remain unchanged. It should be noted that 
none of the respondents think that share prices should decline for any of the 
announcements. Generally, respondents feel that the first and third 
announcements are good news to the market. The opinion of the respondents 
regarding market reaction to repurchase announcements as presented here is 
consistent with the results of previous studies that reported significant excess 
returns accompanying stock repurchase announcements. 
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Table 3 
Management's perception on market reaction to repurchase announcements 
 
 All sample Purchase No purchase 
In your opinion, what would be the market reaction to the following announcement? 
 Price increase Price unchanged Price decrease 
All respondents (N = 118)    
Board's decision announcement 68.6% 31.4% 0% 
AGM/EGM approval announcement  30.5% 69.5% 0% 
Actual buy-back announcement 58.5% 41.5% 0% 
Purchase group (N = 81)    
Board's decision announcement 76.5% 23.5% 0% 
AGM/EGM approval announcement  24.7% 75.3% 0% 
Actual buy-back announcement 53.1% 46.9% 0% 
No purchase group (N = 37)    
Board's decision announcement 51.4% 48.6% 0% 
AGM/EGM approval announcement  43.2% 56.8% 0% 
Actual buy-back announcement 70.3% 29.7% 0% 
 
Reasons for Share Repurchase 
 
This section discusses the results of the main questionnaire that enquired about 
the respondents' views regarding the motivations underlying the use of share 
repurchase. A list of 16 statements that relate to various underlying reasons and 
motivations for share repurchases are listed. The respondents were required to 
indicate the extent of their agreement (or disagreement) to each of the statements 
on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from –2 to +2. The scale is interpreted as 
follows: –2 means strongly disagree, –1 agree, 0 no opinion, +1 agree and +2 
strongly agree. We ran a reliability test on the statements and obtained a 
Cronbach's alpha coefficient of 0.832, which exceeded the usual critical value. 
 
Table 4 presents the results of the survey. The first column shows the 
mean score for all respondents, the second column shows the mean score for the 
"purchase" subsample, and the third column presents the mean scores for the "no 
purchase" subsample. The statements are arranged based on the mean score of the 
total sample, from highest to lowest. Figures in parentheses are t-statistics for the 
mean being different from zero, while the last column shows p-values for the 
difference in the means of "purchase" versus "no purchase" groups. 
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Table 4 
Mean score of the respondents for share repurchase motives 
 
  All samples Purchase No purchase  
Q# Repurchase motive Mean 
(1) 
Rank Mean 
(2) 
Rank Mean 
(3) 
Rank p-value 
(4) 
8 To stabilise share 
price 
1.348 
(0.000) 
1 1.297 
(0.000) 
1 1.460 
(0.000) 
1 0.061* 
15 Management 
believe shares are 
undervalued 
1.239 
(0.000) 
2 1.260 
(0.000) 
2 1.190 
(0.000) 
3 0.616 
1 To support share 
prices 
1.196 
(0.000) 
3 1.186 
(0.000) 
4 1.216 
(0.000) 
2 0.381 
11 To signal share 
undervaluation 
1.179 
(0.000) 
4 1.237 
(0.000) 
3 1.054 
(0.000) 
4 0.191 
10 To increase EPS 0.917 
(0.000) 
5 0.990 
(0.000) 
5 0.758 
(0.001) 
7 0.001*** 
3 As a strategy to 
increase share 
prices 
0.789 
(0.000) 
6 0.781 
(0.000) 
6 0.812 
(0.000) 
6 0.051** 
13 As a response to 
economic condition 
0.536 
(0.000) 
7 0.395 
(0.000) 
8 0.838 
(0.000) 
5 0.186 
5 To reduce equity 
amount  in capital 
structure 
0.416 
(0.000) 
8 0.419 
(0.000) 
7 0.406 
(0.025) 
9 0.478 
9 To reduce no of 
shares outstanding 
0.406 
(0.000) 
9 0.335 
(0.003) 
11 0.568 
(0.001) 
8 0.001*** 
4 To return excess 
cash to shareholders 
0.365 
(0.000) 
10 0.381 
(0.001) 
9 0.326 
(0.044) 
11 0.732 
2 As a substitute to 
cash dividend 
0.355 
(0.000) 
11 0.359 
(0.002) 
10 0.350 
(0.021) 
10 0.872 
16 To gain publicity 
for the company 
0.068 
(0.475) 
12 0.136 
(0.218) 
12 –0.081 
(0.661) 
14 0.064* 
14 Lack of investment –0.110 
(0.152) 
13 –0.236 
(0.030) 
14 0.160 
(0.360) 
12 0.047** 
7 As a defensive 
strategy to avoid 
take over 
–0.118 
(0.109) 
14 –0.196 
(0.017) 
13 –0.053 
(0.720) 
13 0.365 
6 To accumulate 
treasury shares 
–0.288 
(0.000) 
15 –0.369 
(0.000) 
16 –0.106 
(0.457) 
15 0.736 
12 To increase firm’s 
gearing 
–0.312 
(0.004) 
16 –0.344 
(0.010) 
15 –0.241 
(0.203) 
16 0.232 
 
Note: Ratings are based on a scale of –2 (strongly disagree) to 2 (strongly agree). Column (4) provides p-values 
for statistical test in which the mean in purchase group and no purchase group is equal to zero. ***, ** and * 
denote a significant difference at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Our results indicate that the top four reasons are related to the 
undervaluation of shares. The reason with the highest mean score is "to stabilise 
share prices", followed by "management believes shares are undervalued", "to 
support share prices from further decline" and "to signal that shares are 
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undervalued". However, these four reasons indicate both the circumstances and 
reasons that prompted the company to decide to repurchase shares. Management 
views that its shares are being incorrectly valued by the market and that prices 
have gone too low, which prompts the company to step in to support the shares 
from further decline. Our results are consistent with the undervaluation 
hypothesis discussed earlier. Furthermore, the top four reasons correspond 
exactly to the major reasons given by respondents in the open-ended question, as 
presented in Table 1. It should also be noted that the "purchase" and "no 
purchase" groups also agree with the first four reasons being the most important 
in their repurchase decisions. In addition, the mean score for the first reason is 
significantly different between the two sub-groups, with the "no purchase" group 
showing a higher mean score.  
 
The next three reasons relate to the firm's effort in using repurchase as a 
strategy to increase share prices. The stated reason is "to increase EPS", "a 
strategy to increase share prices" and "as a response to economic conditions". 
These statements are in fact closely related to the first four statements discussed 
above. These statements indicate direct reasons for firms to repurchase shares as 
an effort to induce demand for the shares that would initiate a price increase. A 
related reason is that repurchase would necessarily increase EPS. It is often 
mentioned in press releases and in circulars to shareholders that the company is 
undertaking a repurchase in order to enhance the EPS, which in turn would 
precipitate an increase in share prices. As discussed earlier, an EPS increase is 
simply an automatic outcome of repurchase and should in no way be regarded as 
a reason for a price increase. However, as long as the local market continues to 
place (undue) importance on the role of EPS in market valuation, companies will 
continue to use EPS to rationalise their repurchase decisions. In fact, improving 
EPS is also one of the main reasons mentioned by respondents in the open-ended 
question (Table 1). The "purchase" and "no purchase" sub-groups also show a 
somewhat similar ranking for these three statements. 
 
The next two statements refer to changes in the capital structure as a 
motive for repurchases. The statements are "to reduce the equity amount in the 
capital structure", followed by "to reduce the number of shares outstanding". 
Both statements refer to capital structure changes that occur when shares are 
repurchased. Although it is obvious that the changes in capital structure veer 
towards an increase in leverage, in general, the respondents disagree with the 
statement "to increase firm gearing or debt ratio". As mentioned in an earlier 
section, local companies are relatively debt-averse; hence, increasing leverage 
may not correlate with managers’ intention to repurchase. In addition, there is 
disagreement between the "purchase" and "no purchase" groups on the statement 
"to reduce the number of shares outstanding".  
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The next two statements refer to the distribution of cash to the 
shareholders. The statements are "to return excess cash to shareholders" and "as a 
substitute for cash dividend". The statement "to return excess cash to 
shareholders" is meant to correlate with "lack of investment" or "investing in own 
shares", but the latter statement demonstrates a negative mean score and non-
significance. Again, there is some element of inconsistency shown by the 
respondents. As for dividend substitution, given the current single tier tax system, 
there is no difference in terms of shareholder’s wealth between cash dividends 
and repurchases. Therefore, there is no clear reason for companies to use 
repurchases as a substitute for cash dividend. This statement is expected to have a 
negative mean score, but our results indicate that a small number of respondents 
agreed with this reason. There is a clear agreement with the ranking of these two 
statements between the "purchase" and "no purchase" sub-groups. 
 
The next three statements – "to gain publicity", "lack of investments" and 
"as a defence strategy against takeover"– are all non-significant. The last two 
statements — "to accumulate treasury shares" and "to increase firm’s gearing 
ratio" — are not supported by the respondents. There is also a general agreement 
between the purchase and no purchase sub-groups on the ranking of the last five 
statements. Respondents do not support the repurchase motive "lack of 
investment". This result makes sense in the local market as companies can wait 
as long as they wish until a good investment emerges; there is no limit to the 
number of times companies can obtain reauthorisation for repurchase from 
shareholders. Respondents also disagreed with the view that repurchase is used to 
ward off potential takeovers. This result is not surprising in light of the Malaysian 
open-market share repurchases. According to Bagwell (1991), the tender offer of 
share repurchase is more appropriate for takeover defence. 
  
In summary, we find that the main reasons for share repurchases in 
Malaysia are related to the undervaluation of shares and the need to support low 
share prices. Other motives, such as those related to changing capital structure 
and dividend substitution are found to be unimportant reasons for repurchase. 
Respondents also disagreed with the proposition that repurchases are used as a 
takeover defence strategy, as a means to accumulate treasury shares or increase 
the firm’s gearing. We ran the Spearman rank correlation to analyse the 
consistency of responses between the purchase and no purchase sub-groups, and 
we find that they are highly correlated with a correlation coefficient of 0.932, 
significant at the 0.01 level. There appears to be no difference between the views 
of managers of the purchase and the no purchase companies regarding the 
underlying repurchase motivations.  
 
Table 5 presents the results in the form of various repurchase hypotheses 
mentioned in the earlier part of the paper, together with the average of the mean 
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scores. The average mean score is the simple average of the mean scores of the 
statements that are relevant to the hypothesis. As seen in the table, "the signalling 
of the undervaluation of share" hypothesis has the highest score, followed by 
"changing capital structure" and "dividend substitution" hypotheses. The last 
three hypotheses — the lack of investment, takeover defence, accumulation of 
treasury shares — are not supported. We also find that the sub-groups had similar 
rankings for the hypotheses. 
 
Table 5 
Average of the mean score for repurchase hypothesis 
 
 
All sample Purchase sample 
No purchase 
sample 
Signalling undervaluation hypothesis 1.111 1.125 1.082 
• To stabilise share price 
   • Management believes shares were 
undervalued 
   • To support share prices 
   • To signal undervaluation of shares 
   • To increase EPS 
   • Strategy increase share prices 
   Changing capital structure hypothesis 0.411 0.377 0.487 
• To reduce equity amount in capital structure 
   • To reduce number of shares outstanding 
   Dividend substitution hypothesis 0.355 0.359 0.350 
• To substitute cash dividend 
   Lack of investment hypothesis 0.128 0.073 0.243 
• To return excess cash to shareholders 
   • Lack of investment 
   Takeover defence strategy hypothesis –0.118 –0.196 –0.053 
• As a defensive strategy in take over 
   Accumulation of treasury shares hypothesis –0.288 –0.369 –0.106 
• To accumulate treasury shares 
    
Comparison with Previous Surveys 
 
In this section, we discuss our survey results compared to previous surveys. We 
choose three of the most recently available surveys in different markets: Mitchell 
et al. (2001) in Australia, Baker et al. (2003) in the US, and Dixon et al. (2008) in 
the UK. Table 6 presents the comparison of results by showing the rankings of 
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our study vis-à-vis the ranking of other studies. The missing rank number means 
that the statement was not asked by the previous surveys. We do not report the 
mean scores due to the difference in scales used by the different studies.  
 
Table 6 shows at a glance that there is a lack of consistency between our 
study and previous studies. Among our top four reasons, only one reason is in 
Australia's top four, two are in the US, and none are in the UK. The next four 
reasons in our ranking, rank 5 to 8, coincide with only one each for the US and 
UK studies, and none for the Australian study. The following four statements, 
rank 9 to 12, coincide with only one statement for the US study, and none for the 
UK or Australian studies. The final four reasons have negative mean scores in the 
local study; the ranking of these statements does not coincide with any of the 
previous studies under consideration. We ran a Spearman rank correlation 
between our study and the other three studies, as presented in Table 6. The results 
show that the ranks are not highly correlated. The correlation coefficients for the 
Malaysia-Australia, Malaysia-US and Malaysia-UK markets are 0.500 (not 
significant at 10% level), 0.632 (significant at 5% level) and 0.218 (not 
significant at 10% level), respectively. The correlation analysis therefore 
corroborates our observation on the comparisons between these respective 
markets. 
 
The four studies representing the four different markets that are presented 
in the table indicate the uniqueness of each market with respect to their reasons 
for making share repurchases. In the local market, the main reasons for 
repurchases are the undervaluation of shares and the need to support share prices. 
In Australia, the reasons for repurchases are to increase the EPS and because the 
shares are undervalued. In the US, the reasons for repurchases are to add value to 
shareholders and to acquire stock at bargain prices (not shown in the table) 
(Baker et al., 2003). In the UK, the top reasons for repurchases are to realise 
optimal capital structure and to return excess cash to shareholders. It seems that 
Malaysian managers are very similar to Australian and US managers in that they 
have one common reason for repurchase, i.e., 'because shares are undervalued', 
while the UK managers cite entirely different reasons for their repurchase 
decisions. 
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Table 6 
Comparative analysis of ranks with previous studies on repurchase motives 
 
Repurchase motive This research 
Malaysia 
Dixon et al. 
(2008) 
UK 
Baker et al. 
(2003) 
US 
Mitchell et al. 
(2001) 
Australia 
Stabilise share price 1 
 
3 
 Management believe share undervalued 2 6 2 
 Support share price decline 3 
  
5 
Signal share undervalued 4 
 
5 2 
Increase EPS 5 3 3 1 
Strategy increase share prices 6 
   Response to economic condition 7 8 
 
11 
Reduce equity amount in capital 
structure 8 
 
8 
 Reduce number of shares outstanding 9 
 
13 
 Return excess cash to shareholders 10 2 
 
7 
Substitute cash dividend 11 8 10 13 
To gain publicity 12 13 7 
 Lack of investment 13 5 4 
 Defensive strategy in take over 14 11 19 10 
Accumulate treasury shares 15 
 
7 
 Increase firm gearing debt ratio 16 4 
 
6 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This study surveys Malaysian chief finance officers (CFO) concerning their 
reasons for repurchasing their shares as well as various aspects of repurchase 
practices. Our respondents represent 505 companies that announced their 
repurchase decisions over the period 1997–2011. A two-page questionnaire was 
mailed to the CFOs of these companies in October 2012. By mid-2013, we 
received a total of 118 questionnaires that were used for analysis. The Malaysian 
regulations require the approval of shareholders before a repurchase can be made. 
Companies are required to make an immediate announcement of the board's 
decision, of shareholder's approval, and of the actual repurchase if and when one 
is made. The regulations also impose an amount limit and a price limit for share 
repurchases. 
 
Our results may be summarised as follows. The overriding reason for 
Malaysian companies to engage in share repurchases is to protect their share 
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prices from market undervaluation. Some companies obtain shareholder approval 
for repurchases in order to have the right to exercise it when the need arises. 
However, it is found that companies are not in a hurry to buy back their shares 
after obtaining approval, as shown by approximately 30% of the companies in 
our sample not buying back in the first year of approval. Furthermore, it was 
clearly stated by those not making a repurchase in the first year that they had no 
reason to repurchase as either the share prices did not touch the undervaluation 
threshold, or instead, the prices might have increased. Other repurchase motives 
receive less support; these include "to increase EPS", "to adjust capital structure" 
or "as a substitute for cash dividend". Other respondents disagreed with the 
motives of using repurchases as a defence against takeover attempts, to 
accumulate treasury shares, or to increase the firm's gearing. Comparison with 
similar international studies indicates that local managers do understand the 
implications of repurchases and are clear in their reasons for engaging in 
repurchases. The main reason in the local market was centred on undervaluation 
of shares, to increase EPS in Australia, to achieve realise an optimal capital 
structure in the UK, and to add value to shareholders in the US. 
 
The results of this study provide useful insights into the empirical 
findings concerning repurchases in the local markets by Lim and Bacha (2002), 
and Isa et al. (2011), who find positive market reaction to repurchase 
announcements. The current study also casts doubt on some commonly stated 
repurchase motives in the literature. These findings are useful, especially to 
investors for understanding the intention of companies to repurchase shares. 
Regardless of the official reasons stated in companies' circulars to shareholders, 
the underlying reason is always to support share prices, which is consistent with 
protecting shareholders' wealth. Therefore, it seems that the Malaysian 
government made the right decision to allow repurchases in the local market in 
response to the 1997 financial crisis. 
 
 
NOTES 
 
1.  By virtue of the enactment of section 67A of the Malaysian Companies Act 
1965, starting from 1 September 1997, a public listed company is allowed to 
repurchase its own shares using the distributable profit or free cash flow, 
given that prior approval from shareholders is obtained during the Annual 
General Meeting (AGM). 
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